Legal Conclusions Courts' Province, Not That of the Expert Witness
An expert witness cannot tell a jury what result it should reach, nor invade a court's province by giving an opinion on the legal conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, a US district court has noted in its exclusion of a police procedures expert witness.
In James Hagan v. Jackson County, Mississippi et al, US District Court, S.D. Miss., Mar. 21, 2016, defendant Hope Thornton, a detective with the Jackson County Sheriff's Office (JCSO) arrested plaintiff James Hagan for embezzlement after Hagan was found with a laptop computer issued to him by the City of Ocean Springs, a laptop which Hagan had reported as missing.
While Thornton knew that Hagan had reported the laptop missing, she did not know to what extent the City of Ocean Springs had given Hagan the right to have the computer, nor did she have any other information about the laptop or the crime allegedly committed. A grand jury returned a "no true bill" on the embezzlement charge against Hagan.
However, Thornton performed a scan of the laptop and found one image that she believed constituted child pornography. Thornton arrested Hagan again, this time for possession of child pornography. A grand jury indicted Hagan, but the Jackson County District Attorney requested the charge be dropped.
Hagan filed a complaint with multiple claims against Jackson County, Thornton and other police officers involved, including claims of malicious prosecution and failure of the JCSO to properly supervise and train the deputies and other employees.
Hagan's police procedures expert witness, William T. Gaut, PhD, a former police Captain of Detectives, proffered several expert witness opinions, among them that Jackson County subjected Hagan to objectively unreasonable and malicious prosecution and failed to properly train and supervise the Sheriff's Department supervisors and deputies.
The court had previously granted summary judgment to Jackson County on Hagan's malicious prosecution claim in relation to the child pornography charge as they was predicated on criminal proceedings which did not occur. However, in relation to the embezzlement charge, the court found sufficient evidence to "… create a jury question on whether Thornton acted with malice."
Gaut's expert witness report concluded that Hagan was subjected to an "objectively unreasonable and malicious prosecution." The court took issue with this conclusion, finding that Fed. Rule 704 "… does not permit a witness to tell a jury what result it should reach, nor is the Rule intended to allow an expert to invade the Court's province by giving an opinion on the legal conclusions to be drawn from the evidence." The court found the opinion to be "irrelevant," and excluded it.
The court also rejected Gaut's opinion on the failure of the JCSO to properly supervise and train. Gaut did not apparently review the JCSO's training policy, or any documentation of any employee's training, or lack of training, the court noted. Gaut made no reference to JCSO's training policy as to whether it was followed, or inadequate, or what deficiencies in the policy caused harm to Hagan. The court found the opinion irrelevant as well.
Having excluded all of Gaut's opinions, the court precluded him from testifying, striking his designation as an expert witness.
Expert witness opinions that draw legal conclusions are not uncommon, nor is the courts' exclusion of them (see, for example, Expert Witness Opinions Beyond Purview).