Exclusion of Expert Opinion Based on One Faulty Test Abuse of Discretion, Minn.
Using faulty test parameters to support a causation opinion is grounds for excluding the test results and their resulting conclusions, but not grounds to exclude the entire opinion when it is based on multiple factors, the Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled.
In Kedrowski v. Lycoming, Minnesota Supreme Court (No. A17-0538), Mark Kedrowski sued Lycoming and Kelly Aerospace Power Systems, Inc. alleging that they manufactured a defective fuel pump which caused his single engine airplane to crash, causing him severe personal injuries. Lycoming asserted a pilot error as the cause of the crash.
Kedrowski retained Donald Sommer, a mechanical engineer, an FAA licensed airline transport and commercial pilot, and student pilot instructor with over 16,000 hours of flight experience who specialized in aircraft accident reconstruction. Sommer provided a differential analysis, examining all engine parts and only finding defects in the engine-driven fuel pump.
Sommer also interviewed Kedrowski about the crash and the prior engine performance, to which Kedrowski noted that their were occassions when the engine would die after he turned off the boost pump used for starting the engine. That experience with the boost pump meant that the engine-driven pump had a problem as it was not providing for the needs of the engine, Sommer testified. To test that pump, Sommer installed it on another airplane and testified that they could not get the engine to start.
He also supported his causation opinion by testing the engine-driven pump on a flow bench, a test fixture for measuring pump performance based on the revolutions per minute (rpm) of the engine, the psi pressure output by the pump, and the pounds per hour (pph) of fuel flowing through the pump. Sommer obtained flow-bench-test parameters for the pump from a third-party parts vendor which said that the pump should produce 271 pph of flow at 1800 rpm and 24 to 30 psi. Sommer's flow-bench test showed the pump producing only 48 pph of fuel flow at 1800 rpm and 25 psi. Sommer concluded that the pump was unable to produce “design flow and pressure.”
Afterwards, Sommer disassembled the pump and found “potentially a very serious set of leaks in both the inlet and outlet check valves”, a valve that “wasn't installed square in the hole” and manufacturing problems that “created a direct leakage path around the check valve for the inlet check valve.”
Lycoming challenged Sommer on his selection of testing parameters, insisting that its design specifications for the pump should have been used: a “minimum capacity test,” which called for the pump flow to be tested at 2 psi, and a “shut off pressure” test at 1800 rpm and 25 to 30 psi at which the pump should shut off the flow of fuel.
Sommer rejected Lycoming's argument, defended his methodology arguing that Lycoming's design specifications “aren't relevant” as no engine could run at 2 psi and that the engine would not run at shut off pressure since the fuel to the engine would be shut off. He said he tested the pump at parameters “closer to what an engine seats.” On recross-examination, Sommer admitted that a pump was not defective if it met its design parameters (which he had not tested).
Lycoming moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Sommer did not properly test the pump, leaving Kedrowski with “a complete lack of causation that precludes this case from going forward.” The district court overruled Lycoming's objection
At trial, the jury did not find that the Lycoming fuel pump was defective in design, but it did find the pump unreasonably dangerous because of the manufacturing defect and that the defect was a direct cause of the injuries sustained by Kedrowski, finding a total of $27.7 million in damages.
After the jury decision, Lycoming renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law. While the district court found adequate evidence to support the jury's finding of a manufacturing defect, the defects were not enough to prove they caused the plane crash. The court found that Sommer's opinion on causation lacked foundational reliability due to defects in his flow-bench test. With Sommer's opinion excluded, Kedrowski's claims failed, and Lycoming was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, notwithstanding the jury's verdict.
Kedrowski appealed and Lycoming cross-appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. Kedrowski petitioned for review, which the Minnesota Supreme Court granted.
On review, the state Supreme Court found that the district court abused its discretion by excluding Sommer's entire causation opinion when only one ground for the causation opinion lacked foundational reliability. Judgment as a matter of law was an error.
The admission of the flow-bench testing was prejudicial, the state Supreme Court found, but Sommer's causation opinion was based on more than just that test; it also included his differential analysis which found no other defect except in the fuel pump (which was not contested by Lycoming), and his interview with Kedrowski implicating a problem with the fuel pump.
The state Supreme Court concluded that the errors warranted a new trial on liability, reversing and remanding the case.